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Abstract 
 
Statistics show that the sale of goods on credit is widespread among firms even when they are 
capital constrained and thus face relatively high costs in providing trade credit. This study 
provides an explanation for this by arguing that customers that possess strong market power are 
able to increase their customer surplus by demanding to purchase the goods on credit. This gain 
in customer surplus increases with the degree of asymmetric information between buyer and 
seller with respect to product quality. Therefore, firms that are perceived as risky are especially 
subject to the market power of the customer and have to sell their goods on credit. Using detailed 
firm-level data from a large number of firms in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, this paper finds 
evidence consistent with this hypothesis. We find a strong positive correlation between customer 
market power and trade credit provision. Furthermore, this relationship is especially strong when 
the supplier is more risky and in countries with limited financial sector development or weak 
legal system.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Trade credit is created whenever a supplier offers terms that allow the buyer to delay 
payment. Evidence shows that trade credit is an integral part of doing business for a large 
number of firms.1 Petersen and Rajan (1997) and Atanasova and Wilson (2003) show 
respectively that 70 percent of small U.S. firms and 80 percent of firms in the U.K 
provide credit to their customers. A yearly survey of the Mexican Central Bank shows 
that in 2006 on average about 72 percent of Mexican firms provided trade credit to their 
suppliers. A striking feature of the Mexican data that small firms are more likely to 
provide trade credit than larger firms. This contrasts with the situation in the U.S. where 
small firms typically provide less trade credit (see Petersen and Rajan 1997). Since, 
particularly in developing countries, small and medium enterprises are often more capital 
constrained than large firms (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic 2005), these results raise 
the question why, especially in developing countries, small firms sell a relative large 
amount of their goods on credit.  
This study provides an explanation for this by showing that the provision of trade 
credit can increase customer surplus, especially when uncertainty with respect to the 
quality of a desired product is large. As buyer-seller relationships are characterized by 
asymmetric information regarding product quality, a customer, if he cannot insure 
himself against product malfunctioning, will discount the value he expects to gain from 
the purchase with the risk he faces that the quality is worse than agreed upon. So, the 
more risky the exchange, the lower the expected value of the purchase will be. This 
provides the customer with an incentive to demand to buy the good on credit, as this 
allows the buyer to verify product quality before paying, thereby limiting the risk he 
faces (Smith 1987; Long, Malitz and Ravid 1999; Ng, Smith and Smith 1999; Pike, 
Cheng, Cravens and Lamminmaki 2005). In other words, buying goods on credit raises 
the customer’s surplus, especially when dealing with suppliers that are more risky.  
However, providing trade credit is (in most cases) costly to the supplier as it 
diverts money away from his working capital. Furthermore, it can create a moral hazard 
                                                 
1 Several theories have been developed to explain why firms provide trade credit. See, for example, Mian 
and Smith (1992), Smith (1995) and Petersen and Rajan (1997) for an overview.  
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problem for the supplier with respect to customer creditworthiness. This provides the 
supplier with an incentive to favor customers that do not demand trade credit or ones for 
who the cost of providing it is relatively low (for example, customers whose 
creditworthiness has been established through numerous previous trades). However, if a 
supplier faces a customer with strong market power, it will be difficult to find an 
alternative buyer for his goods. In this case, the supplier will have no choice but to give 
in to a customer’s demand for trade credit if he want to make a sale.  In other words, 
suppliers that have customers with strong market power will on average sell more goods 
on credit. As the gain in customer surplus is especially large when the exchange 
relationship is perceived as more risky, customers will especially exert their market 
power and buy goods on credit when a supplier firm is small and located in a less 
developed country. This explains why these firms, even if they are capital constrained, 
are providing more trade credit to their clients.  
Using detailed firm level data of firms from 20 countries in Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia, this paper tests for the impact of customer market power on the use of trade 
credit. It finds a strong positive relationship between customer market power and trade 
credit provision. This relationship is especially strong when the supplier is more risky and 
in countries with limited institutional development. These results suggest that customers 
indeed use their market power to buy goods on credit as a way to increase their customer 
surplus.  
This paper is related to several strands of literature. First, the paper builds on and 
extends earlier work that tries to explain why trade credit is so prevalent amongst firms 
(see, for example, Petersen and Rajan 1997). Specifically, it builds on the work done on 
relational contracting (most notably, McMillan and Woodruff 1999 and Fisman and 
Raturi 2004). Although in this context, the impact of monopoly supplier power on the 
provision of trade credit has been studied, very little empirical evidence exists on the 
impact of customer market power on the provision of trade credit. The few studies that 
explicitly examine it (Banjeree, Dasgupta and Kim 2004; Wilson and Summers 2002) 
focus exclusively on U.S. firms. Furthermore, the fact that Banjeree et al. (2004) studying 
large manufacturing firms find that trade credit and customer market power are negatively 
related, while Wilson and Summers (2002), studying small firms, find a positive 
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relationship, suggest that the presence of customer market power affects different 
suppliers differently. However, the influence of firm characteristics has rarely been taken 
into account in these studies. Second, the paper adds to the literature that tries to explain 
how asymmetric information is dealt with in buyer-seller relationships. Most notably, it 
builds on the work of Ng et al. (1999) and Pike et al. (2005) who study the impact of 
asymmetric information on the terms of trade credit provision. Third, it adds to the 
literature that examines how the institutional environment of developing countries 
impacts firm’s business strategies, as in the work of Demirguc-Kunt and Marksimovic 
(1998).  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide a 
theoretical overview of how customer market power affects the provision of trade credit 
by a supplier. In Section 3 we describe the data and in Section 4 the empirical 
methodology.  The results are described in Section 5. The last section concludes.   
  
2. Theoretical overview 
In an exchange relationship between buyer and seller, the seller typically knows more 
about product quality than the buyer does. This exposes the customer to a moral hazard 
problem if he is paying cash for the product, as assessing the true quality of the product 
beforehand will not be possible. As such, a rational customer, when determining the 
expected value he expects to get from purchasing the product ( )( cVE ), will take into 
account the possibility that the product is of lower quality than expected. In other words, 
the expected value of the purchase (and hence, the maximum price a customer is willing 
to pay for the product) can be represented by the following equation: 
 
))(1()()( ccc QwQeVE ππ −+=   (1) 
 
Where cQe  equals the monetary value the customer has assigned to the product if that 
product has the expected quality, while cQw  reflects the monetary value of the product if 
the quality is lower than expected, with cc QwQe > , and π  equals the probability the 
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product is of the correct quality. So, the higher the uncertainty about product quality the 
lower the price the consumer is willing to pay for the product.  
Assume that the supplier is a price taker in a competitive market, with price 
PPs = . The consumer surplus for each individual customer will then be equal to 
PVE c −)( , which, from equation (1), implies that the customer’s surplus is directly 
affected by the uncertainty surrounding the actual product quality. Reducing the 
asymmetric information between buyer and seller regarding the quality of the product 
will increase the probability that the product is of the expected quality and, as such, the 
surplus the customer obtains from buying the product.  
Risks regarding product quality can be reduced by establishing a long-term 
relationship between buyer and seller so that reputation is built, or by the seller providing 
guarantees. Another way to lessen the risk is the use of trade credit, as it allows the buyer 
to verify product quality before paying, thereby reducing the asymmetric information 
problems (Smith 1987; Long et al. 1999; Ng et al. 1999; Pike et al. 2005). When the 
product is sold on credit the above equation is replaced by:2  
 
     cc QeVE =)(     (2) 
   
Since the supplier is a price taker, providing trade credit to the customer will not affect 
the price ( P ) the customer has to pay. So, trade credit increases the customer’s surplus, 
providing the customer with an incentive to demand it. This incentive will be especially 
strong when asymmetric information regarding product quality is high.  
However, selling a product on credit generates costs for the supplier. First, it 
lowers funds available for working capital needs, which can be especially problematic for 
firms that are capital constrained. Second, it introduces a moral hazard problem for the 
supplier as the willingness of a supplier to sell goods on credit might attract buyers that 
                                                 
2 Note that buying goods on credit can generate costs for the customer ( cTCc ), for example due to the 
significant late payment penalties involved (see Petersen and Rajan 1994). However, as long as 
ccc QwQeTCc )1()1( ππ −−−<   the increase in expected value due to elimination of product quality 
uncertainty will exceed the costs generated by buying the product on credit and the customer will be better 
off buying on credit. If the opposite holds, the customer will prefer to pay cash. For the sake of brevity, but 
without losing the generality of the argument made, we will assume that abovementioned condition holds.   
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are poor credit risk and have no alternative sources of credit. At the same time selling 
goods on credit also has benefits. For example, if the supplier trades frequently with the 
same customer, selling goods on credit lessens the total transaction costs of the sales (see 
Ferris 1981). Since the supplier is a price taker he has no means to adjust the sales price 
when he sells his product on credit. But, the expected value he assigns to the sale ( )( sVE ) 
will incorporate the costs he makes and the benefits he receives from providing trade 
credit ( sTC ). So,    
 ss TCPVE −=)(    (3) 
 
where sss TCbTCcTC −=  and sTCc  reflects the costs to the supplier of providing trade 
credit and sTCb  the benefits. The value of sTCc  will be different for different suppliers 
and is also affected by the type of customer. For example, the cost of providing trade 
credit is relative low for a firm that has no problem to access commercial credit and 
whose customer is a AAA firm he has been trading with for a long time. If the supplier 
trades frequently with this customer, the benefits of providing trade credit will very likely 
outweigh the costs ( 0<sTC ). In this case )( sVE  will be higher when trade credit is 
provided than when the customer pays cash, and the supplier’s surplus ))(( PVE s − ) 
increases by providing trade credit. However, for many suppliers, especially smaller 
firms that are capital constrained, the cost of trade credit will exceed the benefits, so 
providing trade credit will lower the expected value of the sale for the supplier. However, 
as long as the production costs do not exceed the expected value of the sale 
( ))(( ss CVE > ), the firm would be better off making the sale even when a customer 
refuses to pay cash.  
In a market with many buyers, the supplier has a choice between customers, and 
will choose in such a way that his producer surplus is maximized. From equation (3) this 
implies that a supplier will have a preference to engage in sales for which 0<sTC . If no 
exchanges are possible for which 0<sTC  the supplier will prefer to have sales paid in 
cash. When (part of the) potential customers, however, demand trade credit, and even 
though 0>sTC  for each of those customer, he will sell to the customer for whom sTC  
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has the lowest value (as long as ss TCVE ≥)( ). For example, the supplier will have a 
preference to sell to a customer that is more creditworthy. The customer, realizing that 
the supplier has alternative customers he can choose from, will take into account the fact 
that demanding trade credit might make it impossible from him to buy the product from 
that supplier, when deciding to demand to buy goods on credit. As a result in a 
competitive market, suppliers that have no problem raising capital (i.e., firms for whom 
selling goods on credit is relative cheap) will more likely provide trade credit, while 
creditworthy customers are more likely to receive credit.   
However, when instead of multiple customers the market consists of only one, no 
alternative customer will be available to the supplier. In this case, not selling the good to 
the customer will imply that the supplier will not earn anything. In this case, if the 
customer demands trade credit (which he will do as long as 
ccc QwQeTCc )1()1( ππ −−−< ) the supplier will sell the goods on credit, unless his 
production costs exceed )( sVE . As the benefit of buying goods on credit for the customer 
is particularly large when doing business with a supplier who is perceived as risky, 
especially risky suppliers are expected to sell goods on credit when the customer has 
market power.   
The analysis above suggests that due to the positive impact of trade credit on 
customer surplus, ceteris paribus, (1) customers that have market power will receive more 
trade credit than customers that do not have market power, and (2) customers with market 
power will exert their power to buy goods on credit especially when the exchange with 
the supplier is more risky. In the next section we test empirically whether this is indeed 
the case.  
  
3. Data 
The data used in this paper come from the EBRD-World Bank Business Environment and 
Enterprises Performance Survey (BEEPS), developed jointly by the World Bank and the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. This is a survey conducted in order 
to asses the quality of the business environment of the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union. It is a survey of managers and owners of a large 
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number of firms and it provides comparative measurements of the investment climate, 
quality of governance and the competitive environment, which can then be related to 
different characteristics of the firm and to firm performance. The main focus of the survey 
is on microeconomic and structural dimensions of a country’s business environment, 
viewed in an international process.  
In each country the BEEPS asks 200-600 firms questions about their business 
environment and their interactions with the state. The samples are chosen in a uniform 
way in each country, with sector composition divided according to contribution to GDP.  
Firms that operate in sectors subject to government price regulation and prudential 
supervision, such as banking, electric power, rail transport, and water and waste water 
were not included. The sample includes quotas with respect to certain firm criteria (size, 
ownership, exporter, location and age) to ensure sufficient numbers of firms to conduct 
analysis on firms with certain characteristics. Furthermore, enterprises with only 1 
employee or more than 10,000 employees were excluded, as were enterprises that only 
began operations in the three years prior to the survey.  
The survey comprises of quantitative indicators such as sales, supplies, ownership, 
sources of finance and employment levels, along with qualitative questions dealing with 
the opinion of the firm’s manager on the business environment and with his motivation to 
do business. The survey has been carried out in three rounds: 1999, 2002 and 2005, 
however, in this study we will only use the data from the 2002 survey as the variable that 
provides a good proxy for customer market power is only included in this questionnaire.  
The survey is conducted in 27 countries, however, seven countries (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Macedonia, FYR, Tajikistan, Serbia and Montenegro, 
and Uzbekistan) are excluded from the sample as some explanatory variables are not 
available for these countries. After excluding firms that sell 75 percent or more of their 
sales to their parent companies or their own subsidiaries, our sample includes 5,164 firms. 
Table 1 shows the number of firms in each country with information on the provision of 
trade credit. 
This database is unique for a number of reasons. First, it provides information for 
a large group of developing countries that differ substantially in their economic 
development, which allows us to test the impact of cross-country differences on the 
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provision of trade credit. Second, the vast majority of the firms surveyed are small and 
medium enterprises and especially for these firms cross-country data have not been 
readily available. Third, and especially important for our purpose, this database explicitly 
provides information about the customers the surveyed firm is doing business with. This 
has the major advantage that information about market power of customers can be derived 
directly from the survey and thus does not have to be proxied for example by looking at 
industry concentration levels.  
 
4. Hypothesis formulation and empirical strategy 
In this section we test formally whether customers exert market power to buy their goods 
on credit in order to raise their customer surplus by lessening asymmetric information 
problems regarding product quality.  This is summarized in the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis: Suppliers that sell goods to customers with strong market power will extend 
more trade credit. The higher the risk in the exchange relationship the more 
pressure customers will put on their suppliers extend trade credit.    
 
In order to test this hypothesis we use a cross-sectional regression analysis. The survey 
provides a useful measure of provision of trade credit, as the respondents were asked 
what percent of the firm’s sales were sold on credit. This gives us a dependent variable 
(soldoncred), which shows variability beyond the yes and no distinction of a dummy 
variable often used in this type of studies.  
 Ideally, one would like to measure customer market power in the exchange 
relationship by determining the sales concentration ratio. Unfortunately, the survey does 
not provide this exact number. However, it contains a variable that indicates whether less 
or more than 20 percent of the sales go to the three largest customers of the firm. 
Therefore, our variable capturing consumer market power (custpower) is a dummy which 
is one if the firm sells at least 20 percent of its sales to its three largest customers and 
zero otherwise. A positive and significant sign for custpower indicates that customer 
market power raises the percentage of goods sold on credit, and as such provides 
evidence in favor of our hypothesis.  
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 The increase in customer surplus will be especially high when asymmetric 
information regarding product quality is large. Therefore, we expect the impact of 
customer market power to be especially large when suppliers are firms whose product 
quality is harder to determine. It is often argued that small and young firms are 
informationally opaque, especially in developing countries, increasing the magnitude of 
asymmetric information problems between buyer and seller. Therefore, if our hypothesis 
is correct we should find that customers with strong bargaining power exert their power 
more when they buy goods from these firms. In other words, a significant and negative 
interaction between custpower and size and age of the firm provides evidence in favor of 
our hypothesis.  
 Firms that lack access to finance often also lack a strong reputation. In addition, 
lack of access to finance implies that providing trade credit is relatively expensive, so one 
would expect these firms to be less willing to sell goods on credit. Indeed several studies 
have found that the provision of trade credit and access to finance are positively 
correlated (see, for example, Petersen and Rajan 1997). As such, a significant and 
negative relationship between the percentage of goods sold on credit and an interaction 
between custpower and a firm’s access to finance, is also evidence in favor of our 
hypothesis.  
Finally, the need for quality insurance is higher when the goods sold are 
heterogeneous as opposed to homogeneous. For example, Long et al. (1993) find that 
firms producing products whose quality requires longer to assess are more likely to 
extend trade credit relative to sales. Therefore, if customers exert their market power in 
order to limit asymmetric information problems and so increase their customer surplus, 
we would expect the interaction between customer market power and the technical 
complexity of the product sold to be positive.  
Besides firm characteristics, also certain country characteristics, like the 
development of the financial and legal system, can have an impact on the extent or cost 
of asymmetric information between buyer and seller and as such affect the risks faced by 
the customer. When a financial system is relatively well developed more information is 
available on firm’s credit histories. This information can serve as a guarantee for product 
quality, reducing asymmetric information problems between buyer and seller. Therefore, 
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a negative relationship between the interaction of custpower and the development of the 
domestic financial system provides evidence in favor of our hypothesis. 
When a country’s legal system is not well developed the costs associated with 
asymmetric information regarding product quality will be larger as firms have less legal 
recourse. As a result, if customers exert their market power to lessen asymmetric 
information problems, they will do more so in a country where the rule of law is weak. 
This suggests that the relationship between the interaction of custpower and the 
development of the legal system should be negative.  
The variables used in the various interaction terms are measured as follows: the 
variable size equals the log of the number of permanent plus temporary employees and the 
variable age equals the log of the age of the firm. To determine whether the firm has 
access to sources of finance we use a hypothetical question in the survey that asks how 
easy it would be for the firm to obtain a short-term working capital loan on commercial 
terms. Based on the answers to this question we construct a dummy variable, access, 
which is zero if the firm answered the question with ‘impossible’ or very ‘difficult’ and 
one if it answered ‘fairly difficult’, ‘fairly easy’ or ‘very easy’. The variable that captures 
whether the firm makes higher-tech products, tech, is a dummy which is one if the firm 
developed a new product line and/or developed a new technique that substantially 
changed the way the main product is produced in the last three years and/or received ISO 
certification, and zero otherwise.  
The development of the domestic financial sector, private, is measured by the ratio 
of the claims on the private sector by deposit money banks to GDP. This variable has 
been used in previous studies examining the impact of differences in financial  
development across countries (see, for example, Rajan and Zingales 1998 and Demirguc-
Kunt and Maksimovic 2002). To measure the development of the legal system we use a 
commercial index of expert’s evaluations of the efficiency of the state in enforcing 
property rights within each country produced by the International Country Risk Rating 
agency. This measure, legal, reflects the degree to which the citizens of a country are 
willing to accept the established institutions to make and implement laws and adjudicate 
disputes. The measure ranges from one to six, with a low value indicating that claims in 
general are settled by physical force or illegal means, while a high value implies that 
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sound political instruments and a strong court system exist in the country. This indicator 
has been used in many previous studies comparing institutions in different countries (see, 
for example, Knack and Keefer 1995 and Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic 2002). 
Table 2 contains the sample statistics of the variables we consider. In addition to 
the variables discussed above, we also control for some potential firm-specific and 
country-specific determinants of the provision of trade credit. These include both age of 
the firm and the number of employees. We allow the relationship between both age as 
well as size and the provision of trade credit to be non-linear, as we expect that additional 
years of the firm add significantly to a firm’s reputation early in life, but will have little 
effect later. A similar argument can be made for the size of the firm. Furthermore, we 
include access as a control variable to account for the fact that firms with access to 
external finance potentially pass on funds to financially less secure firms. The variable 
tech is also added as a control variable, as firms that produce goods that are technically 
more advanced are more likely to provide trade credit.   
The export content of the firm’s sales can potentially impact the percentage of 
goods sold on credit (see for example Ng et al. 1999), and as such should be controlled 
for. The relationship can be positive reflecting the fact that a buyer will likely demand 
more credit as international trade is more risky or the fact that international customers are 
potentially more creditworthy, lessening the risk from the supplier’s side. Or it can be 
negative, as from the seller’s perspective international trade intensifies information 
problems. As to control for the impact of export, we created a dummy variable export, 
which is one if the firm exports at least 25 percent of its products directly (exports 
through a distributor are not taken into account). A final firm characteristic for which we 
control is the monopoly power of the supplier. Theoretically, the impact of monopoly 
power on the provision of trade credit can either be positive (see Petersen and Rajan 1995 
and McMillan and Woodruff 1999), or negative (as argued by Fisman and Raturi 2004). 
To control for the impact of monopoly power, we include the variable monop. This is a 
dummy variable that takes on the value one if the firm faces less than 4 competitors in the 
domestic market and expects that demand would not be affected by a price increase of 10 
percent and zero otherwise. 
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In addition we included several variables to control for country effects. We control 
for development of the financial sector and the legal system by including the variables 
private and legal. As argued by Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2002) the development 
of a country’s banking system and the use of trade credit by firms can theoretically either 
be substitutes or complements, indicating that the correlation could run both ways. In 
addition, the development of the legal system and the usage of trade credit are expected to 
be negatively correlated. Efficiency of a legal system is more important for financial 
intermediaries than for suppliers in their risk exposure, as trade creditors are in a better 
position to punish debtors without resorting to the legal system for example because they 
can withhold further deliveries. When law and order is strong bank credit will be easier to 
come by lessening the relative importance of trade credit, especially when bank and trade 
credit are substitutes.  
Following Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2002), we also include three 
macroeconomic variables that can potentially affect the provision of trade credit. First, 
real GDP per capita (gdpcap) which controls for the economic development of the 
country. Second, the growth rate of real GDP per capita (growth) to control for potential 
business-cycle effects, and third, the rate of inflation (inflation) which may proxy for the 
willingness to enter into long-term financial contracts rather than short-term trade credit. 
Finally, to correct for the possibility that the provision of trade credit varies systematically 
by sector, sector dummies are included: manufacturing, mining, construction, 
transportation, wholesale and retail, real estate, tourism and other firms.  
 Our model is as follows: 
 
iciccic
icicicic
SXF
RiskConspowerConspowerSoldoncred
εδγβ
ααα
++++
++=
'
1
'
1
'
1
'
210 *        (1) 
 
where i refers to the individual firm and c to the country in which the firm is located. 
icRisk  is a vector of firm and country characteristics that impact the risk associated with 
the exchange for the customer with respect to product quality. the existence of 
asymmetric information between buyer and seller. These include firm size, firm age, 
access of firm to formal credit and institutional development of the country in which the 
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firm is located. icF  is a vector of firm characteristics, including size, age, access to formal 
credit, export activities and monopoly power. cX  is a vector of country characteristics, 
including development of financial sector and legal system, real GDP per capita, growth 
rate of real GDP per capita and inflation. icS  is a vector of sector dummies.  As our 
dependent variable shows a concentration around zero and 100 percent OLS regression is 
not appropriate. Therefore, we use as our regression model a standard Tobit model with 
two-sided censoring.3 In addition, the standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity.  
Table 3 shows the correlation matrix for the variables in our study. The fact that 
customer market power is associated with more trade credit provides some preliminary 
evidence in favor of our hypothesis. In the next section we will test this more formally.   
 
5. Results 
5.1 Impact of customer market power 
 
The main focus of this paper is to test whether customers exert their market power to buy 
their goods on credit in order to lessen asymmetric information problems concerning 
product quality. Table 4 presents the results. To aid the economic interpretation we show, 
instead of parameter estimates, the marginal effects for the unconditional expected value 
of the dependent variable, E(y*), where y*=max(a, min(y,b)) where a is the lower limit 
for left censoring (0) and b is the upper limit for right censoring (100).  
 The first column in table 4 indicates that there indeed exists a positive relationship 
between customer bargaining power and the provision of trade credit. This provides a 
first indication that customers use their market power to buy more goods on credit in 
order to extract surplus. However, the result could also reflect the fact that suppliers are 
more willing to provide more trade credit to customers with strong market power because 
they are more creditworthy firms. As pointed out by Petersen and Rajan (1997), buyer 
reputation and credit rating can reduce concerns about non-payment and as such facilitate 
the provision of trade credit. Although we do not know the characteristics of the three 
largest customers, we do know that a negative correlation exists between our variable 
                                                 
3 A two-side censored tobit model is also used by McMillan and Woodruff (1999) who have a comparable 
dependent variable.   
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measuring customer market power and the percentage of total sales sold to small firms 
and individuals. So, firms with strong market power are often more creditworthy firms.  
 The subsequent columns in table 4, however, provide further support to the idea 
that customers indeed use trade credit to extract customer surplus. In all cases, except 
one, the interaction terms show the expected results, indicating that customers especially 
use their market power when doing business with the supplier is risky. When asymmetric 
information between buyer and seller is relatively large because the firm is small, young 
or has no access to commercial lines of credit, the impact of customer bargaining power 
on the amount of goods sold on credit is significantly larger. For example, the impact of 
customer bargaining power on the goods sold on credit more than doubles when the firm 
is financially constrained. Furthermore, in countries where asymmetric information 
problems are more severe due to an underdeveloped financial sector or weak rule of law, 
customers will exert more of their market power so they can buy their goods on credit. 
For example, keeping everything else constant, in a country with the strongest rule of law 
(for example Croatia) the difference between the amount of goods sold on credit between 
firms with and firms without customers with bargaining power is only 1 percent. 
However, in a country with the weakest rule of law (Albania) suppliers with customers 
with strong bargaining power sell 12 percent more goods on credit. This difference is 
economically very relevant considering that the mean percentage of goods sold on credit 
is 28 percent.   
Only in one case do the results not support our hypothesis. A possible explanation 
for the insignificant, instead of the expected significant negative, interaction between 
custpower and tech, could be the fact that companies that produce technically more 
advanced products are in general larger companies, limiting asymmetric information 
problems. Furthermore, it is possible that the market power exerted by the customer when 
the firm sells technically advanced goods does not lead to an increase in the percentage of 
the goods sold on credit, but is reflected in longer terms of credit as to allow the 
customers a longer time to test the quality of the product (Long et al. 1993). 
Unfortunately we have no information on the terms of trade credit, thus testing for this is 
not possible. 
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The coefficients of the control variables are mostly as expected. Firm size, a proxy 
for the reliability and reputation of a company, is large and significant. With the 
significance of the squared term indicating that the relationship is non-linear. However, 
the coefficient for age is negative. This unexpected outcome might be the result of the 
relative high correlation between age and size. The coefficient on access is also positive 
and highly significant. This finding is consistent with the results found by for example 
Petersen and Rajan (1997), and indicates that a firm with access to commercial credit sells 
more goods on credit than a firm without this access. The positive sign of export, 
significant at the one percent level, indicates that exporters provide more trade credit to 
their customers. This positive relation can be explained by the fact that international 
customers are more creditworthy, or alternatively by the fact that the quality risk faced by 
international customers overrides the increased credit risk faced by the exporters. This 
result is in line with Ng et al. (1999). Like Fisman and Raturi (2003) we find that an 
increase in monopoly power lessens the provision of trade credit.  
Country-level control variables (except private) are coherent over all 
specifications. Consistent with the results found by Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, we 
find a positive relationship between the development of the financial system and the 
provision of trade credit and a negative relationship between the development of the legal 
system and the provision of trade credit. Furthermore, our results suggests that there 
exists a negative relationship between the use of trade credit and the economic 
development of the country, and a positive one between trade credit provision and 
inflation.    
 
Our results provide evidence that customers exert their market power in order to extract 
more customer surplus by reducing the risks they face with respect to product quality. In 
addition, they can explain the seemingly contradictory results of Banjeree, et al. (2004), 
who find a negative relationship between customer market power and provision of trade 
credit, and Wilson and Summers (2002), who find a positive relationship.  
Wilson and Summers (2002), study the impact of customer market power on the 
provision of trade credit by small U.S. firms. Consistent with our results, they find that 
small firms are strongly affected by customer market power, and tend to provide more 
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trade credit to those customers. Banjeree et al. (2004) study the impact of customer 
market power on trade credit decisions of large firms in a well-developed economy. The 
negative correlation they find is also consistent with our results. Our findings indicate 
that customers will especially exert their market power to buy goods on credit when firms 
are small and in countries where institutional development is still in its early stages. In 
fact, if we add to the regression a variable interacting custpower with real GDP per capita 
(last column in table 4) we find a significant and negative marginal effect. Moreover, the 
result shows that, holding all other factors constant, if real GDP per capita exceeds US$ 
7,262 (in our sample only in Slovenia) the relationship between customer bargaining 
power and trade credit becomes negative. In other words, when customers are doing 
business in a well-developed economy dealing with large suppliers (i.e. the uncertainty 
regarding product quality is very limited), the surplus gained from buying goods on credit 
is insignificant and possibly negative. This can explain the negative correlation found by 
Banjeree et al. (2004).     
 
5.2 Sensitivity analysis 
The variable that we use to measure customer market power has some disadvantages. 
First, it is a discrete and not a continuous variable. Second, information on the 
characteristics of the firm’s three largest customers is not available. This implies that the 
variable attaches as much market power to three largest customers when they are small 
firms as it does to three largest customers when they are multinationals. Both factors 
prevent the variable to measure the exact level of market power of the firm’s customers.  
 Even though the survey does not provide us with a more accurate measure of 
customer market power, it does allow us to do a sensitivity analysis using a variable that 
captures customer market power in a different way. In general large customers will have 
more market power than their smaller counterparts, especially when they buy inputs from 
small enterprises. So the size of customers can be used as a measure of customer market 
power. As such, our alternative measure of customer market power, custpower2 , equals 
the percentage of domestic sales sold by the firm to multinationals located in the firm’s 
home country and to large domestic firms (those with approximately 300 plus workers).   
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 The results of the sensitivity analysis can be found in table 5. They indicate that 
our earlier findings are robust to an alternative measurement of customer market power. 
Again we find a positive and highly significant correlation between customer market 
power and the provision of trade credit, and this relationship is strengthened when the 
firm is small or young or when institutional development (as measured by financial sector 
development and the development of the legal system) is weak.     
 In addition to testing the robustness of our results to an alternative way of 
measuring customer market power, we also did some other sensitivity tests (not reported, 
but available from the author upon request). First, we estimated the model with a less 
strict variable for monopoly power: a dummy that is one if the firm has less than four 
competitors and expects demand to be slightly or not affected by a 10 percent price 
increase. Second, we replaced the variable access with one that is more stringent, 
identifying a firm as having access to finance only if short-term working capital can be 
obtained fairly or very easy. Third, we used a different variable capturing the 
development of the legal system using the rule of law variable identified by Kaufmann et 
al (2005). Our results were not sensitive to any of these changes.  
Summarizing, we find robust evidence that customers indeed use their market 
power to pressure suppliers into selling goods on credit in order to increase their 
customer surplus by reducing the risks they face regarding product quality. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The use of trade credit by firms in both developed and developing countries is 
widespread, even when these firms are capital constrained and face relative high costs 
when providing trade credit. Evidence also indicates that in developing countries small 
firms provide more trade credit relative to large firms, while in developed countries the 
opposite is the case. This study provides an explanation for this by arguing that customers 
that possess strong market power will be able to increase their customer surplus by 
demanding to buy goods on credit. This gain in customer surplus increases with the 
degree of asymmetric information between buyer and seller with respect to product 
quality. As such, especially firms that are perceived as risky are subject to the market 
power of the customer and have to sell their goods on credit.  
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Using data from 5,164 firms, mostly small and medium enterprises, in 20 
countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, we find strong evidence indicating that 
buyers use their market power to lessen uncertainty about the quality of the product 
purchased. We find a positive relationship between customer market power and the 
percentage of goods sold on credit and this relationship is stronger when the asymmetric 
information problems between buyer and seller are larger, either because doing business 
with the firm is more risky or because the business environment is less developed.    
The results of this study show that the provision of trade credit can increase 
customer surplus and as such can have a positive impact on the demand for a firm’s 
products. As such, the willingness of a firm to sell his goods on credit can have a 
substantial positive impact on its sales. However, for many firms (especially the more 
risky ones) it is often expensive to sell goods on credit as they are financially constrained 
so late payments can have large costs. Developing country governments could potentially 
lessen these negative side-effects by supporting the establishment of factoring companies. 
By making use of a factoring company, firms can sell their accounts receivable or 
invoices and the factor will collect the debt.  This way the seller can immediately receive 
a percentage of the face value of the receivables, which speeds up the cash flow and limits 
the disruptive effect the provision of trade credit can have on firm growth.   
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Country No. obs Country No. Obs Country No. obs
Albania 128 Estonia 165 Romania 253
Armenia 162 Hungary 246 Russia 477
Azerbaijan 152 Kazakhstan 245 Slovakia 161
Belarus 249 Latvia 175 Slovenia 174
Bulgaria 245 Lithuania 200 Turkey 511
Croatia 182 Moldova 172 Ukraine 461
Czech Republic 250 Poland 494
Table 1 - Number of firms in sample countries 
This table reports for each country the number of firms that provided information on the percentage of goods sold on credit. 
No. Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev.
Dependent variable
Soldoncred 5,102 28.24 10.00 35.01
Asymmetic information variables 
Custpower 5,037 0.53 1.00 0.50
Size 5,087 3.29 3.00 1.70
Age 5,102 2.38 2.30 0.74
Access 4,626 0.61 1.00 0.49
Tech 5,088 0.50 1.00 0.50
Private 5,102 21.38 17.70 10.45
Legal 5,102 4.01 4.00 0.64
Control variables
Export 5,086 0.14 0.00 0.35
Monop 4,965 0.05 0.00 0.22
Gdpcap 5,102 3273.41 2947.00 2344.63
Growth 5,102 5.67 5.70 2.57
Inflation 5,102 12.11 5.10 14.26
Table 2 - Summary statistics 
The summary statisics below are for the sample restricted to the firms with information on the percentage of goods sold on credit. For definition of variables and their
sources see Appendix.
custpower 0.1313 ***
size 0.1168 *** 0.1551 ***
age 0.0004 0.0549 *** 0.3846 ***
access 0.0431 *** 0.0318 ** 0.1344 *** 0.0110
tech 0.0704 *** 0.1239 *** 0.2554 *** 0.0631 *** 0.0513 ***
private -0.0765 *** 0.0625 *** -0.0551 *** 0.1035 *** 0.1198 *** 0.0238 *
legal -0.0422 *** -0.0216 -0.0310 ** 0.0509 *** 0.0627 *** 0.0088 0.5421 ***
export 0.1169 *** 0.1911 *** 0.2708 *** 0.0975 *** 0.0502 *** 0.1192 *** 0.0373 *** 0.0634 ***
monop -0.0277 * 0.0722 *** 0.0680 *** 0.0428 *** 0.0202 0.0426 *** -0.0300 ** -0.0249 * 0.0317 **
gdpcap -0.0489 *** 0.0770 *** -0.0599 *** 0.1004 *** 0.1434 *** -0.0160 0.7665 *** 0.3935 *** 0.0496 *** -0.0069
growth 0.0091 -0.0510 *** 0.0469 *** -0.0876 *** -0.0900 *** -0.0497 *** -0.5249 *** -0.1438 *** -0.0272 * 0.0357 ** -0.5849 ***
inflation 0.1249 *** -0.0604 *** 0.0318 ** 0.0092 -0.0115 -0.0929 *** -0.3474 *** -0.1180 *** 0.0140 0.0371 *** -0.1340 *** 0.1046
soldoncred custpower agesize access tech
The correlation coefficients below are for the sample restricted to the firms with information on the percentage of goods sold on credit.  ***, ** and * correspond to 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent significance levels respectively.  
Table 3 - Correlation matrix
gdpcap growthprivate legal export monop
Custpower 5.35095 *** 11.303 *** 16.088 *** 7.810 *** 6.460 *** 10.892 *** 20.499 *** 9.436 ***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Custpower*Size -1.820 ***
[0.002]
Custpower*Age -4.579 ***
[0.000]
Custpower*Access -3.947 **
[0.040]
Custpower*Tech -2.187
[0.254]
Custpower*Private -0.267 ***
[0.005]
Custpower*Legal -3.887 ***
[0.006]
Custpower*Gdpcap -0.001 ***
[0.002]
Size 6.12407 *** 6.658 *** 5.815 *** 6.056 *** 6.076 *** 6.067 *** 6.047 *** 6.092 ***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Sizesq -0.605 *** -0.553 *** -0.565 *** -0.599 *** -0.600 *** -0.602 *** -0.599 *** -0.604 ***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Age -1.83938 * -1.788 * 0.701 -1.822 * -1.815 * -1.846 * -1.776 * -1.876 **
[0.052] [0.058] [0.547] [0.054] [0.054] [0.051] [0.060] [0.048]
Agesq 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.672] [0.704] [0.753] [0.649] [0.671] [0.672] [0.654] [0.688]
Access 2.360 ** 2.256 ** 2.299 ** 4.460 *** 2.324 ** 2.236 ** 2.323 ** 2.273 **
[0.017] [0.023] [0.020] [0.001] [0.019] [0.024] [0.019] [0.022]
Tech 2.331 ** 2.300 ** 2.416 ** 2.297 ** 3.502 ** 2.386 ** 2.407 ** 2.393 **
[0.023] [0.025] [0.019] [0.025] [0.012] [0.020] [0.019] [0.020]
Export 5.614 *** 5.960 *** 5.607 *** 5.595 *** 5.673 *** 5.670 *** 5.742 *** 5.685 ***
[0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Monop -7.236 *** -7.055 *** -7.155 *** -7.174 *** -7.211 *** -7.458 *** -7.262 *** -7.481 ***
[0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Private 0.081 0.074 0.071 0.076 0.080 0.230 ** 0.082 0.067
[0.389] [0.433] [0.452] [0.417] [0.397] [0.027] [0.384] [0.479]
Legal -1.712 * -1.728 * -1.613 * -1.704 * -1.697 * -1.728 * 0.264 -1.610 *
[0.059] [0.056] [0.075] [0.060] [0.061] [0.056] [0.817] [0.076]
Gdpcap -0.001 ** -0.001 ** -0.001 ** -0.001 ** -0.001 ** -0.001 ** -0.001 ** 0.000
[0.016] [0.016] [0.019] [0.019] [0.016] [0.026] [0.030] [0.938]
Growth -0.383 -0.372 -0.364 -0.364 -0.386 -0.342 -0.336 -0.330
[0.104] [0.115] [0.123] [0.123] [0.102] [0.149] [0.156] [0.163]
Inflation 0.308 *** 0.307 *** 0.304 *** 0.310 *** 0.308 *** 0.312 *** 0.310 *** 0.308 ***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
LR chi2 484.85 498.37 494.49 493.03 485.89 493.76 495.32 494.95
No. obs. 4,440 4,440 4,440 4,440 4,440 4,440 4,440 4,440
(8)
Table 4 - Customer market power and trade credit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
The dependent variable is the percentage of goods sold on credit. The variable custpower is a dummy variable that takes the value one if more than 20 percent of the firm's
sales go to its three largest customers, zero otherwise. Size is the log of the number of permanent and temporary employees. Age is the log of the age of the firm. Access is a
dummy variable that is zero if the firm expects that it is impossible or very difficult to obtain a short-term working capital loan on commercial terms, and takes the value one if
the firm expects this to be faily difficult, fairly easy or very easy. Tech is a dummy for firms with technically advanced products. Private is equal to bank credit extended to
the private sector divided by GDP. Legal , score 1 to 6, is an indicator of the degree to which citizens of a country are able to utilize the existing legal system to mediate
disputes and enforce contracts. Gdpcap is real GDP per capita. Export is a dummy for firms that export at least 25 percent of their sales. Monop is a dummy variable that is
one if the firm has less than four competitors in the domestic market and expects that demand would not be affected by a price increase of 10 percent, zero otherwise. Growth 
is the growth rate of the per capital real GDP. Inflation is the rate of inflation of the GDP deflator. The regressions are estimated using two-tailed tobit, with standard errors
robust for heteroskedasticity. All regressions include sector dummies and a constant. Coefficients are marginal effects. The robust p-values appear in brackets and ***, ** and
* correspond to 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level of significance respectively.
Custpower2 0.146 *** 0.139 *** 0.137 *** 0.140 *** 0.141 *** 0.139 *** 0.134 ***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Custpower2*Size 0.513 ***
[0.000]
Custpower2*Age 0.985 **
[0.012]
Custpower2*Access 2.011
[0.953]
Custpower2*Tech 2.144
[0.113]
Custpower2*Private 0.078 ***
[0.004]
Custpower2*Legal 0.796 ***
[0.000]
Size 5.599 *** 5.431 *** 5.611 *** 5.623 *** 5.640 *** 5.590 *** 5.528 ***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Sizesq -0.586 *** -0.596 *** -0.585 *** -0.585 *** -0.587 *** -0.581 *** -0.573 ***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Age -1.777 *** -1.806 *** -2.337 *** -1.800 *** -1.814 *** -1.789 *** -1.806 ***
[0.001] [0.000] [0.038] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Agesq 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.687] [0.641] [0.599] [0.687] [0.689] [0.739] [0.699]
Access 1.753 * 1.849 * 1.838 * 0.761 1.854 * 1.860 * 1.839
[0.081] [0.080] [0.083] [0.157] [0.084] [0.085] [0.101]
Tech 1.832 ** 1.805 ** 1.752 ** 1.832 ** 0.691 *** 1.782 ** 1.722 **
[0.021] [0.024] [0.022] [0.021] [0.004] [0.022] [0.012]
Export 4.620 *** 4.411 *** 4.390 *** 4.586 *** 4.548 *** 4.496 *** 4.230 ***
[0.009] [0.005] [0.006] [0.009] [0.009] [0.010] [0.005]
Monop -6.373 ** -6.533 ** -6.572 ** -6.469 ** -6.450 ** -6.413 ** -6.630 **
[0.042] [0.031] [0.033] [0.042] [0.045] [0.039] [0.042]
Private 0.000 *** 0.023 *** 0.023 *** 0.024 *** 0.023 *** -0.023 * 0.020 **
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.078] [0.047]
Legal -1.942 *** -1.961 *** -1.949 *** -1.998 *** -2.018 *** -1.963 *** -2.286 ***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Gdpcap -0.001 *** -0.001 *** -0.001 *** -0.001 *** -0.001 *** -0.001 *** -0.001 ***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Growth -0.417 -0.424 -0.427 -0.428 -0.416 -0.433 -0.434
[0.438] [0.376] [0.425] [0.437] [0.449] [0.484] [0.893]
Inflation 0.277 *** 0.283 *** 0.285 *** 0.281 *** 0.282 *** 0.282 *** 0.286 ***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
LR chi2 823.53 834.66 827.70 823.53 821.74 835.57 875.41
No. obs. 4,403 4,403 4,403 4,403 4,403 4,403 4,403
Table 5 - Sensitivity analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
The dependent variable is the percentage of goods sold on credit. The variable conspower2 gives the percentage of domestic sales sold to multinationals located in the home
country and to large domestic firms. Size is the log of the number of permanent and temporary employees. Age is the log of the age of the firm. Access is a dummy variable
that is zero if the firm expects that it is impossible or very difficult to obtain a short-term working capital loan on commercial terms, and takes the value one if the firm expects 
this to be faily difficult, fairly easy or very easy. Tech is a dummy for firms with technically advanced products. Private is equal to bank credit extended to the private sector
divided by GDP. Legal , score 1 to 6, is an indicator of the degree to which citizens of a country are able to utilize the existing legal system to mediate disputes and enforce
contracts. Export is a dummy for firms that export at least 25 percent of their sales. Monop is a dummy variable that is one if the firm has less than four competitors in the
domestic market and expects that demand would not be affected by a price increase of 10 percent, zero otherwise. Gdpcap is real GDP per capita. Growth is the growth rate
of the per capital real GDP. Inflation is the rate of inflation of the GDP deflator. The regressions are estimated using two-tailed tobit, with standard errors robust for
heteroskedasticity. All regressions include sector dummies and a constant. Coefficients are marginal effects. The robust p-values appear in brackets and ***, ** and *
correspond to 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level of significance respectively.
Variable Definition Source
Soldoncred BEEPS Survey
Custpower BEEPS Survey
Custpower2 BEEPS Survey
Age BEEPS Survey
Size BEEPS Survey
Access BEEPS Survey
Tech BEEPS Survey
Export BEEPS Survey
Monop BEEPS Survey
Private
Legal International Country Risk Guide
Gdpcap World Development Indicators
Growth World Development Indicators
Inflation World Development Indicators
Growth rate of real per capita GDP. 
Inflation rate of the GDP deflator.
Real per capita GDP.
Percentage of goods sold on credit.
Measure of law and order tradition in the country, scored 1 to 6. Low
scores indicate a tradition of depending on physical force and illegal
means to settle claims. High scores indicate sound political
institutions and a strong court system.
Dummy variable that takes on the value one if the firm developed a
new product line and/or developed a new technique that substantially
changed the way the main product is produced in the last three years
and/or received ISO certification, zero otherwise. 
Dummy variable that takes on the value one if the firm exports at
least 25 percent of its products directly (exports through a distributor
are not taken into account), zero otherwise. 
Credit extended by deposit money banks to the private sector divided
by GDP.
Log of the age of the firm
Log of the number of permanent plus temporary employees (full-time 
and part-time).
International Financial Statistics and 
World Development Indicators
Dummy variable that takes on the value one if the firm faces less than
4 competitors in the domestic market and expects that demand would
not be affected by a price increase of 10 percent, zero otherwise.
Dummy variable that takes on the value zero if the firm expects that it
is impossibe or very difficult to obtain a short-term working capital
loan on commercial terms, and one if the firm expects this to be fairly
difficult, fairly easy or very easy.
Appendix - Variable Definitions and Sources
Percentage of domestic sales sold to multinationals in the firm's home
country and to large domestic firms (those with approximately 300
plus workers). 
Dummy variable that takes the value one if more than 20 percent of
the firm's sales go to its three largest customers, zero otherwise. 
